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Abstract
While there is a large literature on how individual incomes move over time,
we know much less about couples’ joint income dynamics. Current research on
individual income dynamics has increasingly considered heterogeneity – do all
individuals’ incomes evolve in the same way, or does a particular individual’s
income evolve in the same way throughout their life? This paper considers
the analagous questions for couples – do all couples’ incomes move together
in the same way, or does a particular couple’s incomes move together in the
same way throughout their marriage? In particular, I find evidence of correlated volatility; husbands with volatile incomes tend to have wives with volatile
ones. I find weaker evidence for heterogeneity in the correlation of husbands’
and wives’ income changes, with some couples incomes moving together while
others moving in opposite directions. Couples’ income changes are negatively
correlated early in marriage, particularly when young children are present, and
become more positively correlated over time.
∗
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Introduction

There is a very large literature on individual income dynamics, on how individuals’
incomes evolve over time. Much of this literature is focussed on income volatility, the
variance of income changes.1

Recent work in this area has focused on identifying

latent heterogeneity in volatility; some people may face income changes with larger
variances than others. (Meghir and Pistaferri, 2004; Alvarez, Browning, and Ejrnaes,
2001; Jensen and Shore, 2011, 2012)
The literature on couples’ joint income dynamics – how couples’ incomes move
together – is much smaller. (Lundberg, 1985; Cullen and Gruber, 2000; Hyslop, 2001;
Dynan, Elmendorf, and Sichel, 2007; Shore, 2010) Just as recent research has focussed
on heterogeneity in individuals’ income dynamics, this paper considers heterogeneity
in couples’ joint income dynamics; do all couples’ incomes move together in the same
way? Heterogeneity in couples’ joint income dynamics could reflect assortative mating
in volatility, so that individuals with volatile incomes tend to marry each other;2 it
could also reflect heterogeneity in co-movement, so that some couples’ incomes move
together while other couples’ incomes move in opposite directions. Both of these
phenomenon show up in the cross-section of couples’ income changes as bivariate
kurtosis (Mardia, 1970, 1974, 1980), the tendency of large (absolute) income changes
for husbands and wives to coincide. In years in which a husband’s earnings changes
substantially (either rising or falling), his wife’s income tends to change substantially
(either rising or falling) as well. However, correlated volatility can be separated from
heterogeneity in co-movovement with panel data or other covariates given certain
1

Papers on this subject include Hall and Mishkin (1982); Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994); Moffitt
and Gottschalk (1995); Daly and Duncan (1997); Carroll and Samwick (1997); Dynarski and Gruber
(1997); Cameron and Tracy (1998); Geweke and Keane (2000); Haider (2001); Gottschalk and Moffitt
(2002); Batchelder (2003); Hacker (2006); Comin and Rabin (2006); Gottschalk and Moffitt (2006);
Hertz (2006); Winship (2007); Bollinger and Ziliak (2007); Bania and Leete (2007); Dahl, DeLeire,
and Schwabish (2007); Shin and Solon (2008).
2
Alternatively marriage could make income volatility for husbands and wives more similar than
it would have been had they not wed.
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assumptions.
These distinctions are important for understanding the economic effects of coupling. Positive assortative mating in volatility may be optimal given positive assortative mating in risk-aversion, as predicted by Chiappori and Reny (2006).

Risk

tolerant individuals may choose risky income streams for themselves, and also seek
partners with risky income streams (leading to positive assortative mating on riskaversion). Conversely, absent heterogeneity in risk-aversion, we would expect negative
assortative mating in volatility, as the cost of marrying a high-risk spouse is lower
for a low-risk person. Heterogeneity in the covariance of couples’ income changes is
important because it suggests differences across couples in the risk-sharing benefits
of marriage. Nordblom (2004) shows that some of this variation in the diversification
benefits of marriage may stem from differences in legal regimes that my affect the degree of commitment and cooperation while Chami and Hess (2005) shows that there
is cross-state variation stemming from differences in states’ levels of undiversifiable
risk. Hess (2004) shows that such variation can predict divorce.
Changes over time in couples’ joint income dynamics suggest changes in labor
and leisure complementarities over the life cycle. This paper shows that early in
marriage, particular when young children are present, couples’ incomes are negatively
correlated. Couples’ income changes become more positively correlated as the number
of years a couple has been married increases. One possible interpretation of this lifecycle pattern is that it reflects life-cycle changes in the relative importance of various
economic benefits of marriage. Early in marriage, one spouse’s production may be
a substitute for the production of the other; increases in income by one spouse will
tend to coincide with increases in home production (and decreases in market work) for
their partner. This suggests that the specialization in production described in Becker
(1973) is particularly dominant early in marriage. Later in marriage, complementarity
of leisure may become more important; this could explain the increasingly positive
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co-movement of couples’ incomes nearing retirement. This phenomenon is studied
most frequently in the context of couples’ joint retirement decisions, which frequently
coincide. (Hurd, 1990; Burtless, 1990; Gustman and Steinmeier, 2000; Maestas, 2001;
Michaud, 2003; Casanova, 2010) Simultaneous retirement is frequently motivated by
leisure complementarities: leisure time in retirement is more enjoyable if you can
share this leisure time with your spouse.
These ideas are applied to couples’ income data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. In the data, wives’ income changes are approximately uncorrelated
with their husbands’ income changes.3 However, they are not independent, as couples’ squared income changes are positively correlated; there is bivariate kurtosis, so
that husbands’ large income changes (increases or decreases) tend to coincide with
wives’ large income changes (increases or decreases). A “wife-swap bootstrap” test
strongly rejects the independence of couples income streams, finding substantial bivariate kurtosis. This procedure is appropriate when the pair of random variables
(here, husbands’ and wives’ income changes) are unconditionally uncorrelated but
each spouse’s income changes may be autocorrelated (as in this case). This test is
designed to measure the amount of matching that can be seen in couples’ joint income
dynamics, relative to a null hypothesis of random pairing; this paper strongly rejects
the hypothesis that couples’ joint income dynamics resemble what would be expected
from random pairing. By comparing results for various measures of income and hours
worked, much of this stems from large changes in wives’ hours (and not wages per
hour) coinciding with large changes in their husbands’ incomes.
Correlated volatility can explain much of the observed bivariate kurtosis; wives
whose income shocks have large variances tend to be married to husbands whose
3

See sample moments from Table 3. For example, the unconditional sample correlation of simultaneous one-year changes in husbands’ and wives’ incomes is approximately -0.2 percent; the
hypothesis that the covariance is zero cannot be rejected. Results are very similar for the transitory
measure of couples’ income changes. For the permanent measure of couples’ income changes, the
correlation is approximately -2 percent; the hypothesis that these covariances are zero can separately
be rejected at the 95 percent confidence level but not the 99 percent confidence level.
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income shocks also have large variances.

Correlated variance parameters explain

more than 28 percent or 90 percent (depending on the measure of income changes)
of the observed bivariate kurtosis. This looks like the positive assortative mating on
income risk of interest to Chiappori and Reny (2006).
Heterogeneity in co-movement – with some couples’ incomes moving together while
other couples’ incomes moving in opposite directions – is also present. This covariance
heterogeneity explains 10 percent to 33 percent of bivariate kurtosis.

2

Data

Data are drawn from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The PSID is a
nationally representative panel of U.S. households that has tracked families annually
from 1968 to the present. Data are not collected in even-numbered years after 1997;
this paper uses data collected through 2005. However, since most analyses use oneyear income changes, only data through 1997 will be used in most circumstances.
The PSID includes data on households, including household food consumption and
the education, income, hours worked, employment status, and age of husbands and
wives. I use annual labor income as a measure of income. I restrict the sample to
married couples, to couples where the marriage is the husband’s first, to observations
for which both the husband and wife are between the ages of 22 and 60, and for which
the couple has been married for no more than 35 years.
I remove the predictable (to the econometrician) component of income and examine the time series properties of the unpredictable component, excess log income. As
is common in the literature, this excess log income is the residual from a least-squares
regression of the natural log of labor income (for either the husband or the wife) on
the following regressors: a cubic in age for each level of educational attainment (none,
elementary, junior high, some high school, high school, some college, college, graduate
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school) for both husband and wife, a cubic in the number of years the couple has been
married, the presence and number of infants, young children, and older children in
the household, the total number of family members in the household, and dummy
variables for each calendar year.4 So that log income results are not dominated by
income values close to zero, I limit the regression sample to individuals who earn at
least $1, 000 (in 2001 dollars).
The residuals from this regression are Winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles,
so that residuals below the 5th percentile are replaced by the 5th percentile value and
those above the 95th percentile are replaced by the 95th percentile value.

At the

same time, values omitted from the initial regression because real annual income was
below $1, 000 are given the 5th percentile residual value. The vast majority of these
initially omitted values have an income of exactly zero. This reduces selection bias
by including extreme values, while at the same time limiting the degree to which
such outlier drive the results. Even more important, it allows us to exploit variation
coming from transitions into and out of the labor force.

One-year changes are

demeaned.
Table 1 presents summary statistics on one-year changes in excess log income
for husbands and wives.
relatively small.

Note that most one-year excess log income changes are

The inter-quartile ranges for wives (xit from −10 percent to 8

percent) and husbands (yit from −8 percent to 10 percent) are modest.

However,

there are occasional very large changes in income, so that the standard deviations of
one-year income changes (55 percent and 32 percent, respectively) are much larger
than the inter-quartile ranges. These fat-tails could be the result of fat-tailed shocks
(occasional large income changes) or heterogeneity (some observations are expected
to have larger variances while others are expected to have smaller variances, though
conditional on these variances tails are not fat).
4
This procedure ensures that predictable income changes such as the typical life-cycle pattern of
income are not included in measuring couples’ idiosyncratic joint income dynamics.
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Table 1: Distribution of Spouses’ One-Year Change in Excess Log Income
Spouse
Mean
St. Dev.
Observations
Minimum
th
5 Percentile
25th Percentile
50th Percentile
75th Percentile
95th Percentile
Maximum
lag
1 Year
2 Years
3 Years
4 Years

Wives Husbands
0
0
0.5490
0.3184
20,762
20,762
-2.8499
-1.8283
-0.8390
-0.5258
-0.0955
-0.0796
-0.0179
0.0064
0.0806
0.0987
0.9305
0.4708
2.8141
1.8410
Autocorrelation
-0.2133
-0.3193
-0.0766
-0.0445
-0.0251
-0.0217
-0.0395
-0.0169

This table presents the distributions of one-year changes in Winsorized excess log income for wives
and hubands, xit and yit , respectively. The construction of Winsorized excess log incomes is
explained in the text. In brief, annual log labor incomes for husbands and wives are separately
regressed on a host of covariates. The residuals from these regressions are Winsorized at the 5th
and 95th percentiles. These changes are de-meaned, so means are zero by construction. The median
one-year change would be exactly zero in the absence of de-meaning, so −1 times the median values
gives the average annual change. The sample is limited to observations where data exists in the six
years prior to the year in question.

The patterns of autocorrelation are also presented in Table 1. One-year increases
in income tend to be followed by decreases in the following year for both husbands and
wives, with very small decreases in subsequent years . While small, autocorrelations
at lags greater than one year are larger here than in Abowd and Card (1989), primarily
because income changes are Winsorized.

Another noteworthy result is that one

spouse’s income changes are nearly uncorrelated with lagged changes in the other’s
income.5
5

For example, the correlation between yit and xit−1 is 0.0001 and the correlation between yit and
xit−2 is -0.0028.
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3

Results

3.1

Income Dynamics

Here, I present a standard income process.

Model parameters from this process

may differ across couples and over time. While more complex income processes are
possible, it is standard in the literature to assume that excess log income is composed
of permanent (p) and transitory (ε) components:

zyit = pyit + εyit ;
t
X
ωyiτ .
pyit = pyiT0i +

(1)

τ =T0i +1

Here, zyit refers to the excess log income of the husband in household i in year t. The
same process could be applied to wives as well, with xs replacing ys. xit and yit will
be defined as changes in excess log income over an interval, xit ≡ zxit −zxit−k and yit ≡
zyit −zyit−k . In equation 1, transitory income, εyit , is assumed to be i.i.d. with variance

2
σyε
|it ; permanent income, pyit , is assumed to have a unit root so that innovations to

2
permanent income, pyit −pyit−1 = ωyit , are i.i.d. with variance σyω
|it . Subsequently,

2
“transitory variance” refers to the variance of transitory income, σyε
|it ; “permanent

2
|it . These
variance” refers to the variance of innovations to permanent income, σyω
conditional variances may differ across individuals and over time.
If husbands’ and wives’ incomes individually evolve as in equations 1, it is natural
to consider the joint income process where couples’ income shocks may be correlated.
For couple i at time t, I consider E [ωxit ωyit ] ≡ (σxyω |it) and E [εxit εyit ] ≡ (σxyε |it),
which I subsequently refer to as the “permanent covariance” and the “transitory
covariance.” While husbands’ transitory shocks may be correlated with wives’ permanent ones, and vice versa, these cross-covariances are assumed to be zero here.
In this setting, I consider three {xit , yit } measures to identify the variance-covariance
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structure of different types of shocks: raw, permanent, and transitory. Each measure
is named by the type of covariance identified by the product of husbands’ and wives’
income changes, xit yit . Couples’ income change moments for each measure are shown
in Table 3
1. Raw: The simplest measures of the variance or covariance of income changes
come from contemporaneous one-year changes: xrit ≡ zxit − zxit−1 and yrit ≡
zyit − zyit−1 .

These income changes include both permanent and transitory

components, so their squares and products will as well.

From Table 3, the

unconditional sample mean of xrit yrit is close to zero, with an implied correlation
of −0.2 percent (statistically insignificant difference from zero).
2. Permanent: To isolate the permanent covariance without contamination from
the transitory variance, I consider the short-term change in a wife’s income and
the long-term change in her husband’s income that spans this short term change:
xωit ≡ zxit − zxit−1 and yωit ≡ zyit+2 − zyit−3 . So long as permanent shocks enter
in over at most 2 periods and transitory shocks damp out in at most 2 periods
(consistent with evidence from Abowd and Card (1989)), this measure isolates
the permanent covariance even when the income process is much more general
than the one specified here (Meghir and Pistaferri, 2004). From Table 3, the
unconditional sample mean of xωit yωit is slightly negative but close to zero, with
an implied correlation of −2.6 percent (statistically different from zero at the
95 percent, but not the 99 percent, significance level).
3. Transitory: Under the specified income process, the transitory covariance can
be identified by looking at the product of income changes for one spouse and
their lag for the other spouse: xεit ≡ zxit+1 − zxit and yεit ≡ zyit−1 − zyit . From
Table 3, the unconditional sample mean of xεit yεit is slightly negative but close
to zero, with an implied correlation of −0.2 percent (statistically insignificant
9

3.2

2

difference from zero).

Determinants of Co-Movement

correlation of couples'
permanent innovations to income (percent)
-10
-5
0
5
10

Figure 1: Co-Movement of Couples’ Incomes Over the Life-Cycle

10

20
years of marriage
corr., predicted

-20

corr. + 2*s.d.
corr. - 2*s.d.

30

Figure plots the predicted correlation of permanent innovations to income as a function of the number of years of marriage. These are calculated as follows. First, the
permanent covariance and permanent variances are calculated for each observation.
These are each regressed on a three-degree polynomial in the number of years of
marriage, and a predicted value of each is then computed for each possible year of
marriage. Correlations are then computed as the ratio of the predicted values. The
two standard error confidence intervals are computed using the delta method.

-40

While couples’ co-movement is roughly zero on average (and insignificantly different from zero using the raw and transitory measures of co-movement), the correlation
of husbands’ and wives’ income changes is not zero for every couple or zero at every
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Table 2: Determinants of the Co-Movement of Couples’ Incomes

Dependent
Variable
# of Years
Married

Estimates of the One-Year
Raw Covariance
0.0013***
0.0009***
(4.46)
(3.86)
-0.0035**
-0.0015
# of Kids
(2.12)
(1.17)
Husband’s Years
-0.0014**
of Education
(2.02)
Wife’s Years
0.0016*
of Education
(1.88)
Fixed Effects?
yes
yes
no
Observations
20,762
20,762
20,762
2
R
0.0010
0.0002
0.0015

Estimates of the Permanent
Covariance
0.0010**
0.0003
(1.99)
(0.85)
-0.0000 0.0015
(0.02)
(0.79)
-0.0017*
(1.69)
0.0020*
(1.66)
yes
yes
no
15,478
15,478
15,478
0.0003
0.0000
0.000

This table shows results from OLS regressions that predict permanent and one-year
raw covariance estimates with covariates. t-statistics in parentheses. “*” “**” and
“***” indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

point in the life cycle. In particular, there is strong life-cycle variation in co-movement.
This is apparent in Figure 1, which is obtained by regressing permanent covariance
estimates and variances separately on three-degree polynomials in the number of years
of marriage. These coefficients are used to obtain predicted covariance and variance
values for each year of marriage.

Figure 1 plots the implied correlation for each

year of marriage obtained from this procedure, with confidence intervals obtained
using the Delta Method. Permanent innovations to income are strongly negatively
correlated early in marriage.
of marriage.

This correlation increases with the number of years

This finding is consistent with results from Shore (2010), which uses

repeated observations on the cross-sectional covariance of couples’ incomes to show
that couples’ incomes are negatively correlated early in marriage but positively correlated later in marriage. One possible interpretation of this life-cycle pattern is that
it reflects life-cycle changes in the relative importance of various economic benefits of
marriage. Early in marriage, it may be relatively important that one spouse’s pro11

duction is a substitute for the production of the other; increasing in income by one
spouse will tend to coincide by increasing home production and decreasing market
work by the other. This would imply the negative co-movement found early in marriage and in the presence of children. Later in marriage, complementarity of leisure
may become more important. Working less or retiring early is more appealing when
you can spend the additional leisure time with your spouse, which would explain the
increasingly positive co-movement of couples’ incomes nearing retirement.
Table 2 presents results from regressions to predict co-movement with a host of
covariates.

The covariance of couples’ income changes increases over the life-cycle

of marriage. Ceteris Paribus, this increases the volatility of household income over
time by reducing the diversification benefits of marriage. This will lead to increasing
household income inquality over time for older couples (who have many years of compounded permanent shocks). While the presence of children reduces the covariance
of couples’ income changes, this can be explained fully by the number of years of
marriage. There is weak evidence that that couples with high-education husbands
and low-education wives have more negative covariances.

3.3

Heterogeneity in Couples’ Joint Income Dynamics

The sample moments from Table 3 provides the moments needed to test for bivariate
kurtosis, the tendency of couples large (absolute) income changes to coincide. The
top panel of Table 4 presents the results of these tests, showing substantial and statistically significant bivariate kurtosis. The significance of the results is slightly higher
using the “wife-swap bootstrap”test discussed in the Appendix. This test relaxes
the assumption from the standard test that income changes are not autocorrelated;
in the data, autocorrelations are negative for adjacent observations. The “wife-swap
bootstrap”effectively provides a null hypothesis of how couples’ incomes would jointly
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Table 3: Sample Moments for Couples’ Income Changes
Covariance Measure
xit : wife’s income change
yit : husband’s income
change
xit
x2it
x4it
yit
yit2
yit4
xit yit
x2it yit2
xit yit xit−5 yit−5
2
x2it yit−5
yit2 x2it−5
N

Raw
Permanent
One Year
One Year
Same
Surrounding
One Year Five Years
0
0.0044
0.3013
0.2970
0.8560
0.8235
0
0.0059
0.1014
0.1983
0.1024
0.2173
-0.0004
-0.0055
0.0461
0.0692
0.0009
0.0017
0.0322
0.0593
0.0398
0.0765
20,762
15,478

Transitory
One Year
Lagged
One Year
0.0005
0.3028
0.8540
-0.0004
0.1022
0.1050
0.0003
0.0411
0.0005
0.0279
0.0393
19,430

This table presents sample means over all i and t for which data on xit and yit are both available.
zxit is the excess log income of the wife from couple i in year t; zyit is the excess log income of the
husband from couple i in year t. Sample sizes are smaller for the final three lead-lag moments. See
text for details on variable construction.

evolve if husbands and wives were paired at random (but each spouse’s income was
free to evolve individually as it did in the data). The rejection of this null suggests
that couples’ large income changes tend to coincide far more than would be expected
from random pairing.
Two possible sources of this pattern of bivariate kurtosis reflect heterogeneity in
couples’ joint income dynamics: correlated variances of husbands’ and their wives’
income changes, and heterogeneity in the covariance of husbands’ and their wives’
incomes. Appendix A shows how bivariate excess kurtosis can be decomposed into
these components. Furthermore, that appendix shows how panel data can be used
to bound the relative size of these components. The lower panel of Table 4 presents
results that bound these potential sources of bivariate kurtosis.
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Table 4: Sources of Bivariate Excess Kurtosis for Couples’ Income Changes:
Why Do Couples’ Large (Absolute) Income Changes Coincide?

excess unconditional
bivariate kurtosis, κ̂xy
(z-stat)
(“wife-swap bootstrap” z-stat)
correlated variances,

covi (σx2 |i) , σy2 |i
covariance heterogeneity,
vari ((σxy |i))
excess conditional
bivariate kurtosis, κxy |i

Raw

Permanent

Transitory

1.53

0.52

0.98

(7.58)
(3.02)
(4.71)
(7.68)
(3.28)
(5.01)
Fraction Explained by
> 38%

> 90%

> 28%

> 12%

> 33%

> 10%

< 40%

< −19%

< 55%

xit ≡ zxit − zxit−1 and yit ≡ zyit − zyit−1 if raw estimate; xit ≡ zxit − zxit−1 and yit ≡ zyit+2 − zyit−3
if permanent estimate; xit ≡ zxit+1 − zxit and yit ≡ zyit−1 − zyit if transitory estimate. z-statistics
are against the null hypothesis is that κxy = 0. The first z-statistic assumes that observations are
independent over time and across individuals. The second z-statistic uses the “wife-swap bootstrap”
explained in the text. This implicitly assumes that xit and yit are unconditionally uncorrelated but


allows xit (and also yit ) to be autocorrelated. The lower-bound on covi σx2 |i , σy2 |i is calculated
2
2
from the average of the sample covariance of x2it and yit−5
and the sample covariance of yit
and x2it−5 .
The lower-bound on vari ((σxy |i)) is calculated from the sample covariance of xit yit and xit−5 yit−5 .
The upper-bound on κxy |i is calculated from these lower-bounds from equation 9. The percent
of κ̂xy explained by each of these components comes from equation 6 assuming that the other two
components are zero.

Correlated variances of couples’ income changes, covi (σx2 |i) , σy2 |i



explain much

of the tendency of couples’ large (absolute) income changes to coincide. Husbands
whose incomes are volatile have wives whose incomes are volatile.

The measure

of this based on five-year leads and lags explains at least 38 percent, 90 percent, 28
percent of excess bivariate kurtosis for the raw, permanent and transitory measures of
income changes, respectively. In the case of permanent variance, the large magnitude
is particularly striking; husbands who receive large permanent shocks tend to have
wives who receive large permanent shocks. This finding provides suggestive evidence
of interest in models of assortative mating on risk (Chiappori and Reny, 2006)
14

While there is evidence of persistent covariances (and therefore covariance heterogeneity, vari ((σxy |i))), such heterogeneity is quantitatively smaller and accounts
for far less of the observed excess bivariate kurtosis. If substantial heterogeneity in
covariances exist in these data, they cannot be very persistent.
In the case of permanent income changes, observed excess bivariate kurtosis can
be fully explained by correlated variances. In the case of transitory and raw income
changes, substantial excess bivariate kurtosis remains unexplained. There is no way
to know if this reflects parameter heterogeneity unexplained by the covariates used,
reflects conditional excess bivariate kurtosis, or some combination.

Table 5: Raw Covariance of Husbands’ Excess Log Incomes with Wives’ Excess Hours,
Excess Log Incomes, and Labor Force Participation
Husband’s
Variable: y
Wife’s
Variable: x
Implied Correl.
Excess Kurtosis

Log Income
Log
Income
-0.2%
1.53*

Hours Worked
-3.3%*
0.91*

Log Income if
in Labor Force
2.6%*
0.40

In Labor
Force? 1 or 0
-2.0%*
0.82*

Each column presents the estimates of the raw covariance, as discussed in the text. In
each case, y refers to the Winsorized excess log income of the husband The first row
presents the implied sample correlation; the second row presents the implied excess
kurtosis. ”*” indicates significance at the 5% level.

It is worth noting that the relationship between husbands’ (Winsorized, excess)
log incomes and wives’ (Winsorized, excess) log incomes is also present when looking
at husbands’ log incomes and a variety of work-related variables for wives. This is
significant because couples’ incomes may covary either because of variation in wages,
in hours worked, or labor force participation. Adjustment in hours worked (and
relatedly in home production in leisure) have been shown to be an important source
of benefit in marriage. (Vernon, 2010)
Table 5 presents estimates of raw covariance and excess bivariate kurtosis (ten15

dency of large absolute changes for the husband and wife to coincide) for several
work-related variables for wives.6

The previous results examined the relationship

between changes in the excess log incomes of husbands and the excess log incomes of
wives. Here, we look also at changes in excess hours (level of hours, not log hours,
generated in the same way as excess log income) worked by wives, changes in excess
log income for wives who remain working, and changes in labor force participation for
wives.7 Note that all correlations are small and similar, between −4 and 3 percent.
Excess bivariate kurtosis is greater in the “hours worked” and “in labor force” measures than for the “income if in labor force measure”; the hypothesis that there is no
tendency of couples’ large income changes to coincide cannot be rejected conditioning
on wives being in the labor force. This suggests that much of the variation of interest
stems from changes in wives’ hours; these hours changes tend to be large at the same
time that husbands’ incomes experience large changes.

4

Conclusion

This paper has decomposed observed bivariate kurtosis in couples’ income changes;
absolute income changes of husbands and wives tend to coincide.

There is some

evidence of heterogeneity across couples in the covariance parameter governing their
of income changes; there is strong evidence that husbands’ and wives’ have correlated
parameters governing the variances of their income changes. In the case of permanent income changes, these two forms of heterogeneity explain all observed bivariate
6

Examining long-term changes in these work-related variables for husbands would be less fruitful,
since there is less adjustment in hours and labor force participation for men than for women.
7
Excess hours are calculated just as excess log income but in levels and not logs, with Winsorizing
at the 5th and 95th percent levels. Excess log income for wives who work are just as excess log
income, but with any observations below the 5th percentile or above the 95th percentile dropped.
Changes in labor force participation are −1 if wives leave the labor force, 0 if they remain in or out
of the labor force during the period, and 1 if they enter the labor force. A wife is considered in
the labor force if her income exceeds the 5th percentile level, so that it provides a complement to
the previous variable. Unfortunately, hours data are too noisy to examine wives’ wages, which are
measured as the ratio of income to hours worked. This is problematic when hours worked are zero.
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kurtosis in couples’ income changes.
The bounds on both forms of correlated heterogeneity identified here are useful
for models of the household. The impact of intra-household risk-sharing (as proxied
by the covariance parameter governing couples’ income shocks) on savings, wealth
or consumption will be attenuated – biased towards zero – in OLS regressions since
couples’ covariance parameters are measured with substantial error.

For example,

Hess (2004) uses couples’ covariances to predict divorce as a test of competing theories of marriage. Since instruments for couples’ covariances are weak (and of dubious
exogeneity), it is more fruitful to exploit the full range of variation in covariances in
the data.

To correct for the attenuation bias caused by including noisy measures

of covariance as right-hand-side variables, we need the fraction of variation in parameter estimates that stems from variation in parameters (as opposed to estimation
error). This paper provides an upper bound on the extent of attenuation bias in such
regressions.
Furthermore, this paper documents a high correlation between husbands’ and
wives’ income change variances. This positive assortative mating is what would be
expected in a model of couple formation in which risk-aversion varies across individuals. To the degree that preferences are uniform but the technologies that produce
volatile incomes vary across individuals, negative assortative mating would be predicted.

A
A.1

Appendix: Estimating Sources of Heterogeneity
Model

Consider two variables, xi and yi , that may not be independent of one another but are
mutually independent across observations, i. In the case of couples’ income changes
studies in this paper, xi is the one-year change in “excess” log income for a wife
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in couple i and yi is the one-year change in “excess” log income for her husband.8
The word “excess” (described in detail in Section 2) implies that any aggregate or
predictable changes to income have been removed, so that xi and yi are residuals and
therefore unconditionally mean zero by construction.9
Bivariate kurtosis has been used broadly to refer to the set of possible fourth
moments coming from a pair of random variables: E [x4i ], E [x3i yi ], E [x2i yi2 ], E [xi yi3 ]
and E [yi4 ]. Mardia (1970) proposes a summary statistic that combines these. Here, I
focus on the symmetric moment, E [x2i yi2 ], because of the information that it encodes
about correlated parameter heterogeneity, either the covariance between σx2 |i and σy2 |i

across observations (denoted covi (σx2 |i) , σy2 |i ) or heterogeneity across observations
in σxy |i (denoted vari ((σxy |i))).
If xi and yi have a conditionally bivariate normal distribution, then




(2)
E x2i yi2 |i = σx2 |i σy2 |i + 2 (σxy |i)2 .
I follow Mardia’s convention of using this jointly normal baseline. I refer to the
symmetric bivariate analog to excess kurtosis as excess bivariate kurtosis:
!
E [x2i yi2 |i]

−1 ;
(3)
κxy |i ≡ 3
(σx2 |i) σy2 |i + 2 (σxy |i)2


E [x2i yi2 ]
κxy ≡ 3
−1 .
(4)
2
σx2 σy2 + 2σxy
κxy |i measures bivariate kurtosis conditioning on observation-specific parameters such
as the variances of xi and yi for a given i; naturally, this is unobserved. κxy measures
unconditional bivariate kurtosis and is straightforward to estimate from its constituent
parts. Under conditional bivariate normality, κxy |i = 0. Note that if xi = yi ,
then measures of bivariate kurtosis collapse to the standard univariate definition of
kurtosis.
To consider heterogeneity in lower (than fourth) order moments, I make the simplifying assumption that κxy |i does not vary across observations. In this case, it is
straightforward to rewrite equation 3 as:





 2 2 
κxy |i
(5)
+1
σx2 |i σy2 |i + 2 (σxy |i)2
E xi yi |i =
3



κ|i
2
Subtracting 3 + 1 σx2 σy2 + 2σxy
from both sides, taking expectations (where E [E [x2i yi2 |i]] =
8
The choice of who is x (wives) and who is y (husbands) corresponds to the second sex chromosome
(XX for women and XY for men).
9
the mean-zero
assumption is not central here, it allows the unconditional expectations
 While


E x2i and E yi2 to be relabeled σx2 and σy2 and called variances and allows the unconditional
expectation E [xi yi ] to be relabeled σxy and called a covariance. Since this paper considers latent heterogeneity, it admits the possibility that the variance-covariance matrix of couples’ income
changes may differ ex-ante (but unobservably) across observations, i; σx2 |i, σy2 |i, and σxy |i denote
the elements of this matrix.
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2
E [x2i yi2 ] by the law of iterated expectations), dividing by σx2 σy2 + 2σxy
, and rearranging, equation 5 can be rewritten as:

covi (σx2 |i) , σy2 |i + 2vari ((σxy |i))
κxy = κxy |i + (κxy |i + 3)
.
(6)
2
σx2 σy2 + 2σxy
In other words, unconditional bivariate kurtosis (κxy , which can be estimated from
the data) reflects three (unobserved) factors:
1. conditional bivariate kurtosis, κxy |i;

2. covarying variances, covi (σx2 |i) , σy2 |i ; and,
3. heterogeneous covariances, vari ((σxy |i)).
In the first case, large income changes for husbands and wives tend to coincide
(conditional on husbands’ and wives’ income variances and covariances); in the second case, husbands with high-variance income changes tend to have wives with the
same; in the third case, some couples’ incomes move together while others move in
opposite directions. All three imply the tendency of large absolute income changes
for husbands and wives to coincide. The i subscript on the variance and covariance operators refer to the cross-section of conditional moments over observations i.
For example, vari ((σxy |i)) > 0 indicates that observations differ from one another
in their ex-ante covariance, σxy |i. In the univariate case (setting xi = yi so that
2
2
κx |i ≡ E [x4i |i] / (σx2 |i) − 3 and κx ≡ E [x4i ] / (σx2 ) − 3), this reduces to:
κx = κx |i + (κx |i + 3)

vari ((σx2 |i))
(σx2 )2

(7)

Covariance heterogeneity and correlated variances appear identically in observed
bivariate kurtosis. This is shown in the two panels of Figure 2. The two panels present
the same data, eight hypothetical observations (shown as circles, which are in the same
locations in each panel) for xi and yi . In particular, xi and yi both take on values
of −1, 0, and 1 with probabilities (1/4, 1/2, 1/4) and therefore E [xi ] = E [yi ] = 0
and σx2 = σy2 = 1/2. Were xi and yi to be independent, E [x2i yi2 ] = 1/4. xi
and yi are not independent (though they are unconditionally uncorrelated, σxy =
0) but the marginal distributions of xi and yi are unchanged. The key feature
of this distribution is its excess bivariate kurtosis, the absence (compared with the
distribution under independence) of mass where exactly one variable (xi or yi , but
not both) is zero. Since non-zero values of xi and yi always coincide, the mean of
E [x2i yi2 ] = 1/2 compared to 1/4 in the case of independence.
The two panels present different possible explanations for the bivariate
 kurtosis
2
2
found in this hypothetical data: correlated variances (covi (σx |i) , σy |i > 0, right
panel) or covariance heterogeneity (vari ((σxy |i)) > 0, left panel).
In the left panel, observations are either in a negative covariance state or a positive
covariance state. Covariances, (σxy |i), are either −1 (observations identified with a
negative sign and running from top-left to bottom-right) or 1 (observations identified
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Figure 2: Stylized Joint Distribution of Couples’ Changes in Income
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Stylized depiction of the data. See text for details.

with a positive sign and running from bottom-left to top-right) with equal probability.
Conditional on the covariance, the distribution is trinomial (values of −1, 0, and 1
are possible).
In the right panel, some observations are in a high
 variance state while others are
in a low variance state. Variances, (σx2 |i) and σy2 |i , are either both 0 (marked with
a “low” and clustered at zero) or both 1 (marked with a “high” and found at the
corners) for both xi and yi and the variances for xi and yi are perfectly correlated.
Conditional on the variances, the distribution is binomial (values of −1 and 1 are
possible in the high variance state while only values of 0 are possible in the low
variance state).
If we observe the unconditional distribution depicted in these panels, where large
absolute values of xi and yi tend to coincide, this could reflect either correlated
variances or covariance heterogeneity. A third extreme possibility is that there is no
ex-ante heterogeneity; unconditional bivariate kurtosis reflects conditional bivariate
kurtosis and not correlated heterogeneity. In other words, all observations are drawn
from the same distribution which has the feature that large absolute changes of xi
and yi happen to coincide. Of course, any combination of conditional bivariate
kurtosis, correlated variances, and covariance heterogeneity will be consistent with
the unconditional joint distribution described here.

A.2

Testing for Correlated Heterogeneity

Here, I present distributions for a test statistic for unconditional bivariate kurtosis.
The aim is to test the null that there is no excess unconditional bivariate kurtosis,
the joint normal baseline.
Under the null hypothesis of no bivariate kurtosis when σxy = 0 (a strong but
testable assumption appropriate for the application to follow), for a randomly chosen i
from the population, x2i yi2 will have mean σx2 σy2 and variance (vari ((σx2 |i)) + σx4 ) κx vari
20


σy2 |i + σy4

σx4 σy4 . This is merely the product of E[x4i ] and E[yi4 ] less the square of the mean. Note
that under the null hypothesis and assuming moments
are finite, (vari ((σx2 |i)) + σx4 ) κx


can be estimated with N1 Σi x4i and vari σy2 |i + σy4 κy can be estimated with N1 Σyi4 .
Since observations are assumed to be iid, under the null hypothesis with σxy = 0 the
2
sample variance of xi yi , N1 Σi x2i yi2 − N1 Σi xi yi will have mean σ̄x2 σ̄y2 and variance



1
(vari (σx2 |i) + σx4 ) κx vari σy2 |i + σy4 κy − σx4 σy4 Since we have the distribution
N
of the sample variance it is straightforward to test that null.
Formally, the sample moment N1 Σi x2i yi2 just allows for a test of the independence
of shocks, E [f (xi ) f (yi )] = E [f (xi )] E [f (yi )]. Independence requires that this
be true for all f () and g () and here we look only at second moments, f (xi ) = x2i
and g (yi ) = yi2 . The novelty here is that equation 6 decomposes this particular
rejection of independence into conditional bivariate kurtosis and two types of latent
correlated heterogeneity. In the example that follows, such correlated heterogeneity
is of economic interest. Do all couples’ incomes jointly evolve in the same way?

A.3

“Wife-Swap Bootstrap”

So far, {xi , yi } pairs have been assumed to be independent of other pairs. For a crosssection of randomly chosen individuals who face idiosyncratic shocks, this assumption
may be relatively innocuous. When data
 comes from a panel, this is seldom true.
2
I add time subscripts (e.g., xit , σy |i, t ) to accommodate autocorrelation. In this
2
case, the sample variance, N1 T1 Σi Σt x2it yit2 − N1 T1 Σi Σt xit yit will be drawn from a
distribution with same mean as in the i.i.d. case, σx2 σy2 , but not the same variance:
2

1 1
1 1
2 2
Σi Σt xit yit −
Σi Σt xit yit
(8)
NT
NT





1
(vari ((σx2 |i, t)) + σx4 ) κx vari σy2 |i, t + σy4 κy − σx4 σy4
2 2
∼
σx σy ,
2
+ T1 Σi Σt Σs6=t cov (x2is yis
, x2it yit2 )
NT
The first part of the variance (same as in the i.i.d. case) is trivial to estimate from
sample data as




1
1
1
4
4
2 2
2 2
Σi Σt xit Σi Σt yit − 4 4 Σi Σt xit
Σi Σt yit
;
N T N 2T 2
N T
covariance terms (stemming from autocorrelation) are more difficult to estimate. The
main challenge in a non-rectangular panel is that attrition may be related to the au2
tocorrelation. Without attrition, cov (x2is yis
, x2it yit2 ) can be estimated from data under
2 2
the null as N1 Σi x2is x2it N1 Σi yis
yit . An alternative way to obtain the same variance can
2
be obtained by noting that under the null, var N1 T1 Σi Σt x2it yit2 = var N1 T1 Σi Σt x2it yjt
for a randomly chosen j 6= i. (The non-rectangularity problem can be overcome
if j is chosen so that i and j have the same number of observations.) As a result, it is straightforward obtain the variance of the estimator by repeatedly sampling
1 1
Σ Σ x2 y 2 for different choices of j and taking the variance of these. When x
N T i t it jt
and y refer to the incomes of husbands and wives, this involves randomly pairing all
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husbands and wives from the data, and calculating the estimator for this synthetic
pair. Doing this repeatedly builds up a reference distribution under the null. I use
the tongue-in-cheek name wife-swap bootstrap to refer to this procedure.

A.4

Bounding Correlated Heterogeneity

After rejecting the nullof no excess bivariate kurtosis (because κxy > 0), we know
that covi (σx2 |i) , σy2 |i > 0, vari ((σxy |i)) > 0, κxy |i > 0, or some combination
of these. vari ((σxy |i))> 0 indicates that the covariance differs across observations. covi (σx2 |i) , σy2 |i > 0 indicates that observations with high-variance x also
tend to have high-variance y. While identified from the same moment in the data
1
Σ x2 y 2 , they reflect completely different phenomenon Consider the application to
N i i i
couples, and x refers to the change in husbands’ incomes and y refers to the change
in wives’ incomes. vari ((σxy |i)) > 0 could be interpreted as saying that the diversification benefitsof marriage (proxied by (σxy |i)) vary across couples. By contrast,
covi (σx2 |i) , σy2 |i identifies assortative mating in risk, which could be a test of
models of optimal partner selection.
Without additional information from covariates, conditional kurtosis, correlated
variances and covariance heterogeneity are observationally equivalent. To separate
them, we must use covariates Zi to obtain observation-specific estimates of (σx2 |i),
σy2 |i , and (σxy |i), and then identify the heterogeneity in (σxy |i) or correlated het
erogeneity in (σx2 |i) and σy2 |i that can be traced out by variation in Zi . Consider
the following set of regressions (where each element of xi , µxi , etc, refers to a vector):
 


 2 
βx
µxi
xi
 yi2  = Zi ×  βy  +  µyi  .
βxy
µxyi
xi y i
Variation in (σxy |i) traced out by Zi places a lower bound on vari ((σxy |i)) ≥
βxy Z 0 Zβxy ; correlated variation in (σx2 |i) and σy2 |i traced out by Zi (βx Z 0 Zβy ) pro
vides one source of covi (σx2 |i) , σy2 |i .10 Since additional correlated variation in
variances could be of either sign, the total magnitude of correlated variation in variances is not bounded by βx Z 0 Zβy . Having said that, the panel data approach outlined
in Section A.5 provides a setting where this is likely to be a lower bound. 
From equation 6, lower bounds on vari ((σxy |i)) and covi (σx2 |i) , σy2 |i imply
an upper bound on the importance of conditional bivariate kurtosis in explaining
unconditional bivariate kurtosis. These are the upper-bounds for the importance of
conditional bivariate kurtosis under the assumption that κxy |i (defined in equation 3)
are the same across individuals:

2
κxy σx2 σy2 + 2σxy
− 3 (βx Z 0 Zβy + 2βxy Z 0 Zβxy )
κxy |i ≤
(9)
2 + β Z 0 Zβ + 2β Z 0 Zβ
σx2 σy2 + 2σxy
x
y
xy
xy
10

This bears some similarity to Mardia and Marshall (1984) who provide maximum likelihood
estimates of covariance heterogeneity (traced out by parametric variation) in a conditionally normal
setting.
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Note that all of the objects on the right-hand side of these inequalities can be estimated.

A.5

Panel Data

While panel data complicates estimation of unconditional bivariate kurtosis (see Section A.3), it also provides additional information useful in decomposing it. Couples
i may differ from one another in their
 covariance parameter, (σxy |i); and husbands
with high variance parameters σy2 |i may have wives with high variance parameters (σx2 |i) With multiple observations from each couple, couple-specific estimates
become possible. I assume that there exist s and t sufficiently far apart (for example, a fixed distance k) that common shocks from the two periods are uncorrelated.
In the example that follows, I use s = t − 5. These assumptions are strong, but
are readily testable in the case of couples, whose non-overlapping income changes
are nearly uncorrelated and where any changes in the distribution of parameters is
slow. For example, Abowd and Card (1989) show that innovations to income are not
autocorrelated at lags greater than two years.
p
Most obviously, note that |covi ((σxy |is) , (σxy |it))| ≤ vari (σxy |is) vari (σxy |it).
If the distribution of σxy |i is stable, then this implies |covi ((σxy |is) , (σxy |it))| ≤
vari (σxy |it) (the last equality by the stability assumption). covi ((σxy |is) , (σxy |it))
2
can be readily estimated from the data as N1T Σt Σi xis yis xit yit − σ̂xy
, and this provides a lower bound for vari (σxy |it).
While it is not strictly required by the assumptions above, all but the most pathological distributions will exhibit




1
covi σx2 |is , σy2 |it + covi σx2 |it , σy2 |is
2




1
covi σx2 |is , σy2 |is + covi σx2 |it , σy2 |it
<
2


= covi σx2 |it , σy2 |it
where the last equality follows from stability. Contemporaneous shocks should
be more highly correlated than lead or lagged shocks with a large enough timegap.
This need not be true 
when one variable predicts
 subsequent values for
2
2
2
2
other, but when (σx |is) , σy |it and covi (σx |it) , σy |is are positive and similar in value, contemporaneous
shocks aremore likely to have similar magnitudes.

(σx2 |is) , σy2 |it and covi (σx2 |it) , σy2 |is can be readily estimated from the data


2
2
2
and N1T Σt Σi x2it yis
− σ̂x2 σ̂y2 − 2σ̂xy
, respectively.
with N1T Σt Σi x2is yit2 − σ̂x2 σ̂y2 − 2σ̂xy

2
2
This estimates a lower bound on covi (σx |it) , σy |iy as
1
Σt Σi
NT




1 2 2 1 2 2
2 2
2
x y + x y − σ̂x σ̂y − 2σ̂xy .
2 is it 2 it is
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